The introduction of the capability to “program” a biological system is referred to as Engineered biology and can be compared to the introduction of the internet and the capability of programming a computer. Engineered biology is supported by a digital infrastructure that includes data, data storage, computer-dependent laboratory equipment, internet-connected communication networks, and supply chains. This connectivity is important. It can improve workflows and enhance productivity. At the same time and unlike computer programs, biological systems introduce unique threats as they can self-assemble, self-repair, and self-replicate. The aim of this paper is to systematically review the cyber implications of engineered biology. This includes cyber-bio opportunities and threats as engineered biology continues to integrate into cyberspace. We used a systematic search methodology to review the academic literature, and supplemented this with a review of opensource materials and “grey” literature that is not disseminated by academic publishers. A comprehensive search of articles published in or after 2017 until the 21st of October 2022 found 52 studies that focus on implications of engineered biology to cyberspace. The search was conducted using search engines that index over 60 databases–databases that specifically cover the information security, and biology literatures, as well as the wider set of academic disciplines. Across these 52 articles, we identified a total of 7 cyber opportunities including automated bio-foundries and 4 cyber threats such as Artificial Intelligence misuse and biological dataset targeting. We highlight the 4 main types of cyberbiosecurity solutions identified in the literature and we suggest a total of 9 policy recommendations that can be utilized by various entities, including governments, to ensure that cyberbiosecurity remains frontline in a growing bioeconomy.

As biotechnology continues to develop and the way that science is practised evolves, so too does the nature of crime. We contributed a chapter to Springer’s Cyberbiosecurity book that discusses how a crime science lens can be used to identify new forms of offending that might be facilitated by synthetic biology and related biotechnology with the aim of developing informed strategies to prevent them through an active design process. We use an example of a future biotechnology crime – bio-malware – as identified through multiple methodologies employed, including a systematic review and a Delphi study, to demonstrate our hyBrid hAcKathon dElphi (BAKE) framework and its prospect toward a cyber-biosecurity by design policy.

The United Kingdom has a track record of defining, pursuing and achieving strategic advantage in prioritised areas of science and technology application to deliver prosperity and security for the UK on our own terms and deliver benefits to global society.

Bronic contributed to defining Engineered Biology as a critical technology for the UK as its foundational science base is world-leading.

Marking the 50th anniversary of the United Nations Biological Weapons Convention and the start of its Ninth Review Conference in Geneva at the Palais des Nations, Bronic consulted the United Nations by providing a statement with a proposed framework for the systematic monitoring of advances in Science and Technology through an active design process.

This policy briefing identifies eight potential crimes enabled by synthetic biology and suggests some preventative measures to address them.